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Philosophy of education: Becoming less Western, more African? 
 
PENNY ENSLIN AND KAI HORSTHEMKE 
 
Posing the question: ‘How diverse is philosophy of education in the West?’, 
this paper responds to two recent defences of African philosophy of education 
which endorse its communitarianism and oppose individualism in Western 
philosophy of education.  After outlining Thaddeus Metz’s argument that 
Western philosophy of Education should become more African by being more 
communitarian, and Yusef Waghid’s defence of communitarianism in African 
philosophy of education, we develop a qualified defence of aspects of 
individualism in education. Our reservations about some aspects of 
communitarianism lead us to argue for a role for some forms of individualism 
in African as well as Western education. Finally, reflecting on what is at stake 
in this kind of comparative philosophy of education, we argue that an over-
emphasis on cultural differences can distract philosophers of education from 
the attention they should pay to the common dangers posed across 
continents by the influence of global capitalism on education. 
 
 
1 THE VIEW FROM THE WEST 
 
The fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great 
Britain (PESGB) is an apt moment to take stock of the state of philosophy of 
education in Great Britain and in the wider world – both the West and globally. On the 
evidence of its Journal and its conference papers, the discipline as practiced in this 
Society enjoys greater diversity than it did in its early years in the heyday of analytic 
philosophy of education. Its members are now much more likely to be attuned to 
Continental philosophy, and so it is more broadly Western than it was 50 years ago. 
But what of its relationship with other, different ‘philosophies’ or approaches to 
philosophy of education not historically located in Britain, or the West (sometimes 
referred to as the ‘North’)? That relationship is, inevitably, complex and controversial 
– not least because philosophy of education will like all intellectual endeavours be 
implicated in the colonial and neo-colonial relationships that mark Western 
intellectuals’ engagement with the global South.  
 
In this paper our focus will be on philosophy of education in Africa, though some of 
the issues we will discuss would apply too to other parts of the world where 
philosophy of education is also a historical product of pre-colonial traditions, colonial 
imposition of Western models of schooling – itself an instrument of subjugation and 
government of the natives by Britain and other colonial powers – and latterly a 
combination of postcolonial resistance and neo-colonial policy borrowing. The very 
fact of postcolonial disparities in funding of schooling, higher education and research 
perpetuates deep inequities affecting the conditions under which Western and many 
African scholars are able to pursue the sort of debate we discuss here. To some 
extent these factors may account for the reduced representation of philosophical 
work on education that stems from outside the West, understood largely as Europe 
and North America, in spite of the greater pluralism that philosophy of education 
demonstrates now than it did when the PESGB was founded.  
 
African philosophy of education, however, is well represented in the work of 
Thaddeus Metz and Yusef Waghid. While we do not assume common cause across 
the board in the work of these proponents of African philosophy of education, we 
select their treatment of an apparent central difference between Western and African 
philosophy of education as giving expression to a widely held view. In exploring this 
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stance we set out to take stock of where an ongoing debate has reached, ultimately 
posing the question of what is really at stake and what way forward there might be 
across key differences in clarifying a way ahead for a globally aware philosophy of 
education.   
 
In recent work (Metz, 2015; Waghid, 2014) both Metz and Waghid describe and 
defend African philosophy of education.1 Stated in summary form for the moment, 
Metz’s critique of Western philosophy of education argues that ‘the Western is 
individualist and the African is communitarian’ and ‘the West should become less 
Western’ (Metz, 2015, pp. 1,2) by being less individualistic and more communitarian. 
Waghid’s project is to argue for an African philosophy of education guided by 
communitarian, reasonable and culture-dependent action. In responding to both we 
focus in particular on the contrast they draw between Western individualism and 
African communitarianism. We begin (sections 2 and 3) with an account of the 
positions they take in favour of African communitarianism and against Western 
individualism. Our reconsideration of individualism (section 4) highlights critical 
opposition in Western philosophy of education to the forms of individualism rightly 
opposed by Metz and Waghid, as well as pointing out both a communitarian 
presence in Western philosophy of education and its generally critical opposition to 
many aspects of schooling as practiced in the West. Reservations about some 
aspects of African communtarianism lead us (section 5) to argue for a necessary role 
for some elements of the individualist tradition. Finally, asking what is at stake in this 
kind of comparative philosophy of education (section 6), we argue that an over-
emphasis on cultural differences across continents distracts philosophers of 
education from the shared dangers of the influence of global capitalism on schooling.  
 
2 THE WEST AS INDIVIDUALIST, THE AFRICAN AS COMMUNITARIAN 
 
Metz appears to be advancing both an empirical argument, the conclusion of which 
constitutes the first premise of his overall argument, and a more normative argument, 
the conclusion of which constitutes the second premise of his overall argument, 
before he arrives at a normative conclusion.  
 
The empirical argument: 
Western philosophies of education are individualist. 
Sub-Saharan African philosophies of education are communitarian. 
Therefore, there is a noticeable contrast between philosophies of education typical in 
the West and in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The normative argument: 
There are attractive facets of sub-Saharan African communitarianism. 
On reflection, these facets outweigh the attractive facets of Western individualism. 
Therefore, communitarian rather than individualist facets should inform education. 
 
The overall argument: 
There is a noticeable contrast between philosophies of education typical in the West 
and in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Given their overriding attractiveness, communitarian rather than individualist facets 
should inform education. 
                                                 
1 Waghid’s is an articulation and defence of African philosophy of education from within and drawing on 
elements of Western philosophy, while Metz’s is a critique of Western philosophy of education from an 
African perspective, arguing that the former needs to be more like the latter. 
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Therefore, education in the West and in societies influenced by the West should 
become less Western, in order to accommodate these facets. 
 
Let us accept Metz’s empirical conclusion, though we find its claims rather stark. Our 
doubts grow, as we will show, in considering his normative argument, and we 
disagree with his overall conclusion. While in the paper we discuss here much of his 
attention is focused on characterising the Western, we note that Metz here contrasts 
its thinly relational educational practices and philosophy of education to the rich 
sense of sociality characteristic of African society. On his account, drawing on some 
pre-colonial practices, African educational ends emphasise learning the community’s 
customs, the acquisition of moral personhood, work-based learning as preparation 
for work that supports the community and its development, and dialogue. We accept 
the attribution, for the moment, of communitarianism to African philosophies of 
education, but not the associated claim of an absence of communitarian elements 
from Western philosophy of education. But we will argue that Metz’s treatment of 
individualism as a recurrent tendency, a blind spot in Western philosophy of 
education, is too inclined to emphasise some particular brands of individualism and 
to ignore those that are both compatible with its communitarian strands and 
embedded in debates about the aims, or what Metz calls the final ends, of education 
in Western philosophy of education. 
 
Metz’s description of individualism in Western educational thought and practice 
asserts that Euro-American theory is inclined to value qualities that are internal to 
persons, i.e. their rationality, autonomy, desires, pleasures and self-esteem – 
education that is focused on an individual person seeking self-realisation and who is 
located at a distance from other persons. In philosophy of education in the West and 
educational practice in the United Kingdom, in Europe and in North America, the 
ends of education refer to internal properties,  
such as her autonomy, rationality, intellectual virtues, self-development, self-
esteem, pleasure, desires and work-related abilities. It is extraordinarily 
common to find Western normative theorists maintaining that the ultimate aim 
of education should be to enable the young to judge their traditions, to think 
critically, to freely pursue a conception of the good, to realise themselves and 
so on. Individual agency has become the name of the game. (Metz, 2015, p. 
4)  
 
Metz claims that the individualistic ends of education in the West have 
characteristically been pursued in school buildings dedicated to this purpose by 
professional teachers who impart propositional knowledge that is inclined to be 
established by argumentation, through a curriculum that is both set and tending to 
focus on written texts. Assessment through testing aims to certify individuals for a 
market in which they can compete for jobs. As we will show in section 4 below, this 
characterisation does not match our reading of Western philosophy of education and 
its relationship to schooling practices in the West. 
 
3 AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: ON BEING HUMAN  
 
In his new book, Waghid (2014) undertakes to defend ‘an African philosophy of 
education guided by communitarian, reasonable and culture-dependent action’ (p. 1), 
by drawing ‘on a communitarian understanding of the notion of ubuntu (African 
humanness and interdependence)’ (p. 2). He takes ubuntu to offer a medium not only 
for the enactment of African philosophy of education but also for its contribution 
‘towards achieving democratic justice on the African continent’ (p. 2). The main 
argument of the book is that ‘an African philosophy of education as a practice has 
three constitutive aspects: first, to be reasonable in one’s articulations; second, to 
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demonstrate moral maturity; and third, to be attuned to deliberation’ (p. 5), i.e. to 
‘consensual’ and ‘deliberative dialogue’ (pp. 9, 13). 
 
The idea of African philosophizing (e.g. about education) as a communitarian 
practice is widely shared (see Wiredu, 2004). Yet, Waghid wishes to reject an 
unfeasibly exclusive reading of African philosophy, Africanisation and African 
indigenous knowledge. ‘What needs to be foregrounded is knowledge that 
harmonises the universal (say, what comes from Europe) and the particular 
(traditional thoughts and practices …)’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 3). He is similarly careful to 
avoid any simplistic contraposition of communitarianism and individualism, 
community and individual: 
African philosophy of education as a communitarian practice does not dismiss 
the individual per se. In other words, the favouring of community should not 
necessarily be understood as being at the expense of the individual. Rather, it 
invokes an understanding of education that considers an individual’s 
aspirations and actions as constitutive, as an extension of the community, 
and not in conflict with the latter. (p. 5)  
 
Setting out to avoid any dualistic opposition between the individual and the 
community and insisting that African philosophy of education is not ‘about renouncing 
the individual in favour of community’ (p. 5), Waghid draws on the work of Michael 
Sandel (1982), Michael Walzer (1983) and Charles Taylor (e.g. 1991) as 
communitarian philosophers to develop his account of individualism, suggesting 
some complementarity between Western and African communitarianism. His critique 
focuses on ‘the abstract, atomistic and individualist aspirations of people associated 
with parochial liberalist thought’ (p. 22), by contrast with the emphasis on the social, 
relational, communal human self preferred by communitarians. In this vein, Waghid 
describes African philosophy of education as ‘most favourably positioned to be 
attentive to communal human aspirations that allow space for the enactment of 
human freedom, autonomy and the cultivation of shared, common goods’ (p. 22). 
 
Waghid contrasts this African conception of the interactive, enriching, enduring and 
intrinsic relationship between the individual and the community (p. 45) with the 
atomic individual, sometimes associated with a narcissistic self as the darker side of 
individualism. By flattening and narrowing lives, this type of individualism leaves the 
self the poorer for being unconnected, less concerned with others. This disengaged 
self seeks self fulfilment and is ‘primarily concerned with the right of individuals to 
develop their own form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really 
important or of value for themselves’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 47, citing Taylor, 1991, p. 
14). Waghid illustrates this concern by reference to teachers who make their own 
interests their priority, imposing them on their students (Waghid, 2014, p. 48), as well 
as prioritising individual autonomy ahead of collectivism (p. 47).  
 
To his criticisms of atomistic and narcissistic individualism Waghid adds a third 
category of individualism (drawing on Kymlicka, 1989): possessive individualism, 
which ‘suggests that what people (individuals) want in life is to maximise their share 
of social resources and material goods, rather than promote the good of others or 
their own spiritual well-being’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 47). For atomists, an individual’s 
capacity for meaningful choice is self-sufficient outside of society and culture. 
  
To the alleged atomistic, narcissistic and possessive individualism of the West, 
Waghid contrasts three constitutive aspects of African philosophy of education as a 
practice: reasonableness, moral maturity, and deliberation. Each is given a 
communitarian interpretation, in association with his defence of the notion of ubuntu, 
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as African interdependence and humaneness, a humanistic concept that emphasises 
harmony, cooperation, care and respect (p. 2). 
 
Waghid’s approach to ‘reasonableness’, defining ‘rational justifications’ in terms of 
‘what people offer as reasons for their beliefs, practices and institutions’ (p. 4),  
endorses Kwame Gyekye’s view that ‘African philosophical discourse is embedded in 
two interrelated processes: rational discourse and the application of a minimalist logic 
in ordinary conversations without being conversant with its formal rules’ (Waghid, 
2014, p. 7; Gyekye, 1997, p. 29; see also Waghid, 2014, p. 25ff.).  
An African philosophy of education is not concerned mainly with validity of the 
belief or story, but with the procedure according to which the story is narrated 
– with lucidity and argumentation that will present reasons for one’s views. 
While these reasons might not always appeal to the understanding of those 
who listen, or listeners might contest the logic of the narrations, the existence 
and proliferation of these beliefs must be understood within the context of a 
particular life-world. (Waghid, 2014, p. 7) 
 
Like the other constitutive aspects of African philosophy of education, rationality 
receives a communitarian interpretation and is described as a critical response to 
problems in African society. For Gyekye, ‘rationality is a culture-dependent concept’ 
(Waghid, 2014, p. 7; Gyekye, 1997), so that rationality as understood in Western 
culture may not be applicable in Africa.2  
 
Explaining the notion of moral maturity by drawing on Kwasi Wiredu’s ideas (2004), 
Waghid refers to ‘an educated person’ as someone  
who has attained moral maturity and refinement …. Such a person has 
acquired the virtues of honesty, faithfulness and duty to, and empathy for the 
well-being of others in her community. This implies that an educated person 
has developed a sense of responsibility towards her kin and community. 
(2014, p. 8; emphasis added) 
Acquiring a sense of empathy, responsibility towards others in the community is a 
precondition for both personhood and for being an educated person. Moral maturity 
in African education, as a moral discourse in itself, also embraces sincerity, justice, 
moral sensitivity, responsibility and courage. These virtues, cultivated by an African 
philosophy of education, aim to empower communities towards educational 
development which can address the ‘African predicament’, ameliorating  ‘… poverty, 
hunger, famine, unemployment, political oppression , civil wars, colonialism 
(imperialism) and economic exploitation…’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 8, citing Oladipo, 
1992).  
 
As the third constituent of the social practice of African philosophy of education, 
Waghid includes deliberation and ‘consensual dialogue’ (p. 9) as a significant if not 
essential component of African philosophy of education (see Wiredu, 2004, p. 21). In 
deliberation thus interpreted, Waghid emphasises listening respectfully to the other, 
however inarticulately they may express themselves, or how apparently irrelevant or 
ill-informed their contribution might seem to the listener.  In sub-Sahara Africa, 
consensus is commonly perceived as desirable, and dissensus as undesirable, both 
on epistemic and political grounds. In traditional African societies, debate 
characteristically continues until a compromise is attained and all participants agree 
with the outcome (Metz, 2007, p. 324).  
 
                                                 
2 Like the question of whether one can really speak of indigenous or African knowledge and its 
construction within African traditions, further discussion of this account of African rationality is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. 
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4 INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED 
 
Both Metz and Waghid contrast the preferred communitarian character of African 
education with individualism, which Metz more explicitly associates with both 
philosophy of education and educational practice in the West. Their critique of 
individualism focuses fundamentally on the idea of the atomistic individual, critical 
and autonomous, detached from others, pursuing her own desires and pleasures - 
and on educational practices that set out to foster such an individual.  
 
We will return to the topic of Western educational practice shortly, but need first to 
question this characterisation of Western philosophy of education. Whatever its 
collective failings might be, Western philosophy of education is at the very least much 
more varied in its preoccupations and opinions of the aims of education than this 
description suggests.3 Taking writings in Britain alone as an example, while 
autonomy has featured prominently in extensive debates about aims of education, 
there is no shortage of those who have been sceptical about the idea that it should 
be viewed as an aim of education, let alone its sole aim. Even Robert Dearden’s 
influential essay ‘Autonomy and Education’ (1972) tempers his defence of a Kantian 
notion of autonomy with important qualifications, including that autonomous choices 
are not made in isolation from others, and that supporting autonomy does not 
assume unbridled freedom to do whatever one likes. John White’s work has 
defended autonomy interpreted in an enlarged sense, as moral autonomy that 
includes the good of others (1982). Richard Smith’s scepticism about the usefulness 
of the idea of autonomy (1997) challenges a tendency to think about persons 
atomistically instead of in groups. But Smith is far from alone in this scepticism – and 
he expresses it from within Western philosophy of education. As further evidence of 
the vigorous debate in the West about the aims of education, in his essay ‘Education 
without aims?’ Paul Standish (1999) is both struck by the preoccupation among 
philosophers of education with autonomy as an aim of education and also prompted 
to ask whether there must be aims. In doing so Standish is alert to the debasement 
of educational aims by concerns with ‘accountability, quality assurance, objectives, 
performativity…’ (p. 49). 
 
While some philosophers of education writing in the West would endorse a form of 
autonomy as one of the aims of education (and we note that on Waghid’s account 
autonomy is allowed a role in association with common goods and communal 
aspirations), they would almost without exception share Standish’s concern about the 
debasement of education by the influence of performativity on schooling, including 
higher education. In doing so their criticisms of education as practiced in the West 
and elsewhere have much in common with Metz’s concerns about pursuit of the ends 
of education through institutionalised schooling that aims at certifying persons to 
compete for jobs in the labour market, relying in doing so on assessment by testing.4 
Yet, although forms of testing of the kind Metz rightly opposes are increasingly 
                                                 
3 See Matthew Hayden (2012) for an empirical study of the themes, philosophers, theorists and 
concepts studied by philosophers of education whose work was published in four leading journals 
published in English between 2000 and 2010. ‘Community’ is one of the 25 most frequently referenced 
concepts in the four ‘Western’ philosophy of education journals, though this may indicate interest rather 
than allegiance to any particular account of community. 
4 We will not here discuss the other individualist features that Metz attributes to Western schooling, such 
as a set curriculum taught by professional instructors, though we would want to defend them in some 
form. 
 
 7 
corrupting of education globally, we would want to argue that some forms of 
assessment are less so, especially if formatively offered in ways that are less closely 
hitched to extrinsic ends like employability and if they are more individualistic, in the 
sense of being addressed to a person’s own educational aspirations and regardless 
of extrinsic ends attached to them. For this reason alone, there are grounds for 
defending the supposedly Western idea of education for its own sake. In its worst 
institutional manifestations schooling is counter-educational whether in Western or in 
African and other contexts of the global South. This has been prominently exposed 
by philosophers and sociologists of education in the West and elsewhere, who are 
neither apologists for dominant schooling practices nor normally influential enough to 
see their own ideas enacted in educational provision. If only philosophers of 
education enjoyed such influence! 
 
The types of individualism opposed by Metz and Waghid in their defence of African 
educations’ more communitarian qualities represent a selection of some elements of 
the individualist tradition. But as a strand in modern Western thought, individualism 
comprises several tendencies, some at odds with one another (see Lukes, 1973). 
Some educationally indefensible expressions of individualism should be, and indeed 
have been, rejected by Western philosophers of education, but there are others 
which played a historically progressive role in eroding the often tyrannical, patriarchal 
authority of the monarchy, the church and the nobility. One of these, the notion of 
respect for persons, of human dignity and the worth of each individual human being 
as an end in herself, we would endorse as an underpinning for a defensible 
conception of education, universally, but also as common to most Western 
conceptions of education.  Resting in part on this foundational idea is the widespread 
support for some form of autonomy as an aim of education, even if alternative terms 
like ‘agency’ are preferred and however autonomy might be qualified by insisting on 
locating the individual in relation to others, both ontologically and also by relating it to 
defences of moral and citizenship education. For Western philosophers of education 
learning is social, unavoidably interactive. 
 
By contrast, like the possessive individualism rightly opposed by Waghid, the brand 
of individualism expressed in what Steven Lukes (1973) calls economic individualism 
has found little if any support among philosophers of education. Following its early 
defence by economists like Milton Friedman (1962), it finds its current expression in 
neo-liberal conceptions of the learner as both an investment and a customer who 
pursues her preferences by buying an education that will in turn enable her to take 
her place as a competitive individual working for private profit, thus playing her part in 
making the national economy more globally competitive than others. We note, 
however, in passing, that the employability policy imperative in Western schooling, 
though subject to strong critique by philosophers of education, looks rather like one 
of the features of African philosophy of education, i.e. preparation for work (see, for 
example, Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, pp. 431-433).  
 
Relatedly, political individualism would cast the individual citizen as expressing her 
preferences by voting periodically, on the assumption that the aggregated 
preferences of all such choosers is a rational way to select leaders, whose 
performance would then be assessed by the electorate, who periodically choose like 
customers whether to retain those they have elected, or to replace them with a new 
set of rulers. Philosophers of education writing about citizenship education do not 
favour such a conception of the citizen, and have given much attention to the 
fostering of citizenship as disposed to the common good.  
 
The citizen as autonomous individual would, for some philosophers of education, 
engage in a further form of individualism that Metz regards as favoured by the 
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practices and philosophies of education in the West, i.e. in critical thinking. Metz 
describes this in a form that judges one’s traditions in pursuit of self realisation and 
an own conception of the good. But though most philosophical treatment of critical 
thinking as an aim of education is not about encouraging people to make this kind of 
judgment, this particular concern is also evident in another much debated thread in 
philosophy of education in Britain and the USA that has elicited divergent opinions. 
William Galston (1995) favours protecting diverse individuals and groups rather than 
fostering choice. Thus inclusion is given priority over critical reflection, which may 
undermine ways of life. By contrast, Amy Gutmann (1995) gives individual autonomy 
precedence over diversity, arguing that future citizens should be taught to evaluate 
the different political perspectives associated with different ways of life. Yet even this 
stance hardly matches Metz’s depiction of philosophy of education as encouraging 
young people to judge their traditions. We will return to individual autonomy and 
education for critique again, in our reconsideration of African education as 
communitarianism. 
 
5 COMMUNITY RECONSIDERED 
 
By avoiding the pitfalls of individualism, African communitarianism is apparently 
better equipped to be both a philosophical foundation for education and the basis for 
a consensual approach to addressing the continent’s problems. We see several 
problems with philosophy of education thus delineated, some arising if it is to be 
opposed to individualism in those forms accurately attributable to its interpretation 
and practice in the West, some from the account of community in Africa described 
above, and some from apparent assumptions about the causes of human suffering 
and the kind of political action required to address it. Some elements of 
communitarian thought may not be conducive to the political or educational goals 
sought by Waghid and need to be tempered by elements of individualism. 
 
What is ‘the community’, when applied to the vast continent of Africa in the early 21st 
century? To an extent one can attach the concept to small, local communities in 
neighbourhoods or villages or to organisations whose members might know each 
other, even sometimes to imagined communities when particular issues and 
problems prompt a unified response. To these one can attribute the features of 
community admired for their sociality, shared identity and solidarity. Such 
communities are more readily imagined on all continents either on a small and 
specific scale or in historical contexts prior to modernity, globalisation and the 
postcolonial condition that characterises almost all societies now, notably Britain and 
most of the West. There are a few exceptions to this generalisation, like North Korea, 
perhaps. Yet, even in their mainly bygone more pristine conditions, the rurally rooted 
communities of occidental pre-modernity were not found objects and neither are 
those of contemporary Africa. Their composition, internal relationships, structures 
and hierarchies are the products of power, struggle and negotiation. Some members 
have the power to influence decisions more than others. Viewed from a minimally 
sociological perspective all are marked by at least some structured inequalities and 
their membership and traditions are at least in part a product of the power of those 
who grant themselves the right to determine them. Communities can be oppressive 
and exploitative. So, while we support Waghid’s account of deliberation with its 
emphasis on listening to the other, in practice when deliberation appeals to the good 
of the community it is  often likely to favour its dominant members.  
 
Communities are not only inclined to marginalise some of their members from within, 
as has been the experience of gays in some parts of Africa and the West. If right acts 
are those that value harmony and respect relationships of identity and solidarity 
(Metz, 2009, p. 191; see also Metz, 2007, where he lays the groundwork for an 
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African moral theory), what are the implications for those not of the community? If an 
educated person has acquired a communitarian sense of responsibility toward kin 
and community, the virtues of ‘mutual respect, sincerity, justice and moral sensitivity’ 
rightly prized by Waghid amount to too little if thus confined. Like care, empathy and 
compassion are biased if limited to only some. After all, we tend to empathize to a 
greater extent with those close to us: with family members, members of our primary 
group, close friends, perhaps companion animals, and those whose personal needs 
and concerns are similar to our own, though this is not invariably or exclusively the 
case. Moreover, why should the moral maturity and refinement of an ‘educated 
person’ be measured in this narrow communitarian sense5?  
 
Waghid also leaves unaddressed the reality of many, if not most, traditional societies 
or communities, where duty and responsibility are characteristically understood, for 
example, as an obligation to obey or as a duty of unquestioning loyalty. It is unclear 
whether acting out of such a sense of duty or responsibility will precipitate moral 
maturation, or the development of moral maturity and refinement.  
 
When extended beyond the community, kith and kin, what kind of engagement, 
including political action, might an African philosophy of education prepare persons 
for, given the emphasis that Waghid places on both consensus and deliberation, the 
latter a concept much debated in Western democratic theory, on which his analysis 
draws. We have no problem recognising the significance of deliberation and dialogue 
in (any) philosophy of education: our concern arises with the use of ‘consensual’ and, 
again, with the narrow communitarianism at work in this qualification of ‘dialogue’. It 
is one thing to recognise the value of consensus in small-scale, fragile societies and 
communities; it is quite another to see it as a significant if not essential component of 
African philosophy of education, especially when applied to citizenship education. It 
is easier to associate this account of community with such examples than with much 
larger and more diverse groups, like nation states. What is the community in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or Nigeria, large, ethnically diverse and 
sometimes fractured as they are? 
 
One could ask whether Africa’s ‘misery’ might not in part be more difficult to address 
because of  the preoccupation on the African continent with communalism – which 
underlies obedience to authority, ancestors, and traditional leaders – and arguably 
also of the ‘tyranny of consensus’. Our concern here is that ‘palaver democracy’6, 
which aims at agreement, is considerably less democratic than a system – 
educational or political – that encourages dissent and critical interrogation. Similarly, 
what in practice has the contribution of ubuntu been ‘towards achieving democratic 
justice on the African continent’ (p. 2)? While communalism and ubuntu may well be 
forces for good at times, an over-emphasis on their worth as distinctive of African 
ways is made at the expense of a fuller explanatory picture of the causes of misery, 
which include contemporary corruption, autocratic rule, and the curse of debt traps 
that tax-evading foreign corporations exploit to shore up undemocratic regimes, 
sometimes with the connivance of Western governments.  
 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that Waghid seems to oscillate between this narrow sense and a wider, more 
encompassing understanding of communitarianism. (This is especially noteworthy in his discussion on 
pp. 21-28, where he pays tribute to the work of Sandel, Walzer and Taylor, before reiterating his 
intellectual debt to Gyekye.) Our concern is not with the communitarianism of Sandel, Walzer and Taylor 
– but clearly the question arises what would be left of a characteristically African philosophy of education 
in the defence of such a wider use? 
6 ‘The elders sit under the big trees, and talk until they agree’ (Wiredu, 2000. p. 374; Wiredu refers to a 
quote by Julius Nyerere to substantiate his claim that ‘decision by consensus was often the order in 
African deliberations’; see Waghid, 2014, p. 56). 
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Waghid attributes lapses in African humanism evident in events of human 
catastrophe in Africa like genocide to ‘sporadic surges of atomistic individualism that 
bring a concern for human welfare into conflict with other despotic and patriarchal 
imperatives, such as to dominate  and  exclude  people from authentic ways of living 
– that is , peace, stability and prosperity. However, despite the lapses in living 
ethically, African cultures are still concerned innately with living worthwhile lives…’ (p. 
46). We don’t necessarily question this latter claim about traditional African culture, 
but we do doubt the explanatory power of atomistic individualism thus invoked to 
explain catastrophe on the continent. We know of no credible theorist of social or 
political action, Western or otherwise, who would subscribe to such an account, 
whatever role it might have played as an underlying tendency in some expressions of 
enlightenment thought that are now thoroughly discredited. Moreover, to suggest that 
individual autonomy ought to have a place in depictions of democratic deliberation 
and action in Africa does not commit one to advocate pursuit of responsible self-
determination depicted as the acts of atomistic, isolated individuals. No plausible 
theory of political action would attribute explanatory value to ‘mere acts of 
individualised activity’ (Waghid, 2014, p. 28) by individual selves acting without 
others. Conflict and suffering on all continents are very rarely attributable solely to the 
acts of individuals. That they are is an assumption that flies in the face of well 
established explanations of conflict, which is structurally caused. 
  
6 (PHILOSOPHY OF) EDUCATION: WESTERN, AFRICAN, GLOBAL 
 
In his penultimate concluding remark Metz says, somewhat cryptically: ‘as someone 
who believes that those in the African tradition often miss out on some kernels of 
truth in Euro-American viewpoints, particularly with regard to the value of knowledge 
for its own sake …, I am also partial to the idea that those in Africa should become 
less African’ (2015, p. 8). Our argument has suggested that elements of philosophy 
of education in the West, centrally a qualified notion of critical autonomy, would be of 
value in African education. In doing so we do not reject the relevance of certain forms 
of community to the aims of education, and so to educational practice, especially 
given the growing influence of neo-liberal conceptions of the individual on Western 
schooling. In fact, philosophy of education in the West is not short of either defenders 
of community or critics of neo-liberal influences on education policy and practice, in 
and beyond the West. 
 
But what is at stake, for the practice of philosophy of education, when we make 
remarks like these? To some extent, we are puzzled by what the ultimate point is of 
exchanges like the one addressed here, supposedly between Western and African 
philosophy of education; what resolution might be either desired or possible? In 
posing these questions we hasten to add that trying to think postcolonially about the 
state of philosophy of education at the 50th anniversary of the PESGB neither 
requires nor permits Western triumphalism, just as it inevitably sets limits to a 
retrieval of pre-colonial African traditions. We have no wish to defend the West - 
which has so much to answer for given its history of colonialism and its role in 
enduring neo-colonialism - against the rest in a partisan dispute about which part of 
the globe might have the best conception of aims of education, whether suited to 
local conditions or to cross-continental circumstances.  We think that neither Metz 
nor Waghid seeks the latter kind of resolution either.  
 
In comparative philosophy of education of this kind, several tendencies come into 
play. Metz (2015) makes a strong case for his claim that there is some truth in 
geographical labels like ‘Western’ and ‘African’ and that they plausibly pick out 
properties like ‘individualist’ and ‘communitarian’; as a rough generalisation we don’t 
necessarily disagree, provided we recognise that these categories are neither 
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ontologically nor analytically stable. As we have argued, much remains to be said 
about what content such geographical characterisations may be given. In filling out 
such content, comparison across space becomes mixed in turn into comparison 
across time: past African traditions, meanings and educational practices (which may 
not be all that different from pre-industrial revolution Western traditions and 
education) are commonly compared with selected elements of contemporary 
Western philosophy of education, which is sometimes collapsed into Western and 
indeed increasingly global schooling practices. Conceptual analysis through 
examination of the philosophical treatment or the common, everyday use of key 
educational terms can shade into their reconstruction, sometimes across the regions 
labelled West and Africa, such reconstruction being advanced in advocating change 
in public conceptions of social and educational discourses and practices. 
Anthropological description is not the same as philosophical critique and 
reconstruction, but they are best recognised as different activities which might inform 
each other, and not treated as equivalent or interchangeable. 
 
Our final concern about the dangers of doing philosophy of education across 
continents, between the West and Africa as well as the global South in general, is 
that attending to the apparent differences between them by overemphasising cultural 
differences, whether in their educational or social or political traditions (all 
contestable) distracts attention from the common problems they face at the hands of 
global capital, which is now so internationalised that it would be a serious conceptual 
and strategic error to regard it as either a solely Western force or as indistinguishable 
from what philosophers of education have to say on its appropriation of education to 
the ends that concern Metz. As a contemporary manifestation of capitalism, neo-
liberal forces in education sponsor schooling that is similarly indefensible for all those 
thus schooled, globally. This is schooling not for its own sake, aimed at well being or 
flourishing, at promoting individual autonomy, democracy, social justice, community, 
or citizenship, but at individual and national competitiveness, aided by high stakes 
testing and league tables. It is aimed at preparation for employability in work that is 
increasingly less secure and for low wages, or for structured under- and 
unemployment, implicated in turn in growing inequality both within and across 
countries and continents. Taking a culturalist line on the major challenges that face 
education and so philosophers of education globally distracts attention from these 
shared problems. Marx’s contribution to global thought, while Western in origin 
because he lived and wrote there, has understandably inspired resistance to 
colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. We do well to bear in mind the emphasis in that 
Western and global tradition of thought on the material conditions in which human 
beings live and educate.  
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